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ADMISSIONS PRACTICEt
THOMAS W. EVANS*
Although Judge Lumbard's memoirs' do not mention admis-
sions practice, they provide a valuable lesson to those interested in
this new approach to litigation. The former Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit points out
that when he first went on that bench, it was conventional wisdom
that judges would not read briefs before oral argument. This prac-
tice had the purported benefits of saving time and keeping the
bench free from prejudice. The custom might have continued for
decades had it not been for a visit by Judge Lumbard and others
to England, where they observed the judiciary at work, disposing
of many appeals from the bench directly after argument. Thereaf-
ter, the judges of the Second Circuit began to read briefs and have
the benefit of memoranda, prepared by clerks, prior to argument.
Now the Second Circuit disposes "of its cases faster than any other
circuit."'2 Advance study has made it possible for the court to de-
cide many more cases per judge than before. So much for conven-
tional wisdom.
Admissions practice is an attempt to break through en-
trenched modes of proceeding which have too often turned discov-
ery from a useful aid in litigation to a wasteful, counterproductive
process. It is a relatively new approach, modeled in part on suc-
cessful local procedures and common sense, and made possible in
its full vigor by significant changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure over the past two decades.' Its objective is to eliminate
t This Article has been reprinted with substantial revisions and the permission of the
Center for Public Resources Legal Program, from Occasional Papers of the Center for
Public Resources Legal Program. Four forms are appended to the paper. This Article also
retains its 1985 copyright.
* B.A. 1952, Williams College; J.D. 1958, Columbia University School of Law. The au-
thor is a partner in the law firm of Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon.
COLUM. U. & N.Y.B. FOUND., A CONVERSATION WITH J. EDWARD LUMBARD (1980).
2 Cheever & Frost, 2nd Circuit Rapped for Rushing Rulings, Manhattan Law., May 31-
June 6, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26 & 36. Rule 36, which provides the foundation for admis-
sions practice, states in pertinent part:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:475
unnecessary issues, narrow the ambit of proof, and define remain-
ing issues so that they may be dealt with in the most effective way.
Successful implementation, however, does require the attention of
judges and diligent application by at least one of the protagonists
in the adversary process. Indeed, a departure from a generation of
"conventional wisdom" is required.
AN INCOMPLETE ATTEMPT AT REFORM
In McSparran v. Hanigan,4 a case later quoted with approval
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judge Freedman
stressed the issue-defining function of a request for admission
under rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Specifically,
Judge Freedman stated:
Having adopted a simpler form of pleading the Federal Rules pre-
served in the request for admission the means for obtaining a
conclusive admission of any relevant fact .... Were this other-
wise then the much vaunted improved Federal Rules would be
without a well-known and useful mode of limiting the factual dis-
putes .... 6
Unfortunately, after passage of the new Rules in 1938, lawyers
elected not to limit the issues involved in their lawsuits. They ig-
for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions
of fact or of the application of law to fact including the genuineness of any docu-
ments described in the request....
... An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that the party has made
reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by the
party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny. A party who considers
that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue
for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; the party may, sub-
ject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why the
party cannot admit or deny it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a). The enforcement mechanism of rule 36 is found in rule 37(c), which
states in pertinent part:
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any
matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions
thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the
requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
225 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
Id. at 637.
6Id.
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nored requests for admission, and discovery became a morass. In
recent years, however, rules 36 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which deal with requests for admission and related en-
forcement provisions, have been significantly strengthened.7 Used
in conjunction with the discovery conference incorporated into fed-
eral procedure in 1980,8 the advanced pretrial conference proce-
dure adopted in 1983," the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,1" and the heightened responsibility of attorneys
under revised rules of professional conduct, a fresh approach to
civil litigation can be achieved.
This new approach, which could be termed "admissions prac-
tice," is defined as the use of successive requests for admission to-
gether with discovery and pretrial conferences to narrow issues and
attendant requirements of proof in the course of litigation. Simul-
taneous service of a single omnibus interrogatory requesting rea-
sons for denial can further enhance the efficacy of the procedure. 1
Properly employed, this practice should define issues at the
outset of the case and thereby enhance the opportunity for early
settlement or dispositive motions; make discovery more efficient
and less costly; maintain a balance between active judicial case
management and the adversary process; and reduce the breadth
and complexity of matters presented for trial by court or jury. In
addition, by shifting the obligation of attorney's fees to the party
forcing unnecessary proof, the more frequent resort to admissions
practice should have the effect of deterring unnecessary litigation.
' The manner in which rules 36 and 37 have been strengthened in recent years will be
traced throughout this paper. A comprehensive early history is found in the oft-cited
Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371 (1962).
8 See FED, R. Civ. P. 26(f).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Rule 16(b) advances the pretrial conference in the litigation
continuum to the first 120 days after the filing of the complaint, instead of its customary
posture on the eve of trial. For discussions of the effect of the 1983 amendments on rule 16,
see Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A
Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30
VILL. L. REv. 767, 781-86, 804-05 (1985); Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching,
69 A.B.A. J. 1640, 1642-43 (1983); Walker, The Other 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-Pleadings and Motions; Pretrial and Discovery; U.S. Magistrate
Cases, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 830-39 (1984).
10 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(f) & 26(g).
" The practice of issuing an omnibus interrogatory contemporaneously with requests
for admission was first suggested to the author by John C. Hamilton, Esq., of South Bend,
Indiana. "Because answering this type of interrogatory is more burdensome than simply
admitting the request, it often eliminates frivolous denials." Dombroff, Requests for Admis-
sions: Weighing the Pros and Cons, TRIAL, June 1983, at 82, 83.
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
A MISUNDERSTOOD RULE
As noted, attorneys have generally ignored requests for admis-
sion. Nevertheless, when evasive action has precluded meaningful
response to a request, judges have been reluctant to pursue the
stringent sanctions provided. At least part of the problem comes
from a basic misunderstanding of the rule.
It has been over forty years since the scope of requests for ad-
mission was expanded to include matters of fact other than those
set forth in designated documents, 2 but many lawyers continue to
use requests for admissions only in relation to documents. The
West Publishing Company made its own modest contribution to a
narrow application of the rule by including a misprint of the title
of the rule for a decade in successive editions through 1980. Al-
though the title had been changed in 1970 from "Admission of
Facts and of Genuineness of Documents" to "Requests for Admis-
sion," the West version through the 1980 edition of the Federal
Rules read "Requests for Admission of Documents."
Substantial changes in the rule were brought about by the
1970 amendment, so that matters of opinion and mixed questions
of law and fact are now within its ambit. The amendment did
much to eliminate the traditional "matters in dispute" objection. A
failure to respond is no longer acceptable, even if the matter in
question "present[s] a genuine issue for trial."'" Of course, if the
requests themselves prove to be burdensome in character, the in-
undated party can obtain a protective order under rule 26(c). The
1970 amendment also adopted the majority view, and the position
taken by most commentators, that if the responding party lacks
knowledge, he must inform himself in reasonable fashion and can-
not simply answer on the basis of the knowledge he happens to
possess at the time of the request.'4
Even after the sweeping changes of 1970, some commentators
persist in their basic misunderstanding of the rule. They maintain
that "[s]trictly speaking Rule 36 is not a discovery procedure at all,
since it presupposes that the party proceeding under it knows the
facts or has the document and merely wishes his opponent to con-
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee's note.
i' FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) advisory committee's note.
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) advisory committee's note; see also 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2261 (1970 & Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 62:475
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cede their genuineness.' '15 Such an approach is without foundation.
Certainly there is no suggestion in the rule itself that the subject of
the request must somehow be known to the party propounding it;
to the contrary, the only limitation in the rule is that the subject
matter fall within the "scope of Rule 26(b)," which defines the
scope of discovery generally under the Federal Rules.
16
Another misunderstanding which remains in the treatises in-
volves a concern that requests not cover the "entire case."' 7 If this
view ever had support, the 1970 amendment, with its broad cover-
age, would seem to have laid it to rest. Notions that requests
should be limited to facts or documents in hand and not cover all
elements of the case, stem in part from the early history and sub-
sequent misidentification of the rule, but they have no place in ad-
missions practice today. Greater scope flows not only from the re-
cent amendments to the rule itself, but from the expanded
responsibility of attorneys to conduct a reasonable inquiry in good
faith while responding to discovery requests and to refrain from
concealing documents or other material with potential evidentiary
value.18
The use of requests for admission has significantly increased
since 1970.19 Nevertheless, they still represent a small percentage
of discovery mechanisms currently in use. A survey of requests to
admit in federal practice reveals that:
Before the 1970 amendments to [rule] 36 they were used in but
10 per cent of federal cases, a lower percentage than that of any
other federal discovery mechanism except depositions upon writ-
ten interrogatories. After the 1970 amendments to [rule] 36, re-
quests to admit were not used in 52 per cent of federal cases and
constituted but 5.6 per cent of the total use of all discovery mech-
anisms in the remaining 48 per cent of cases.20
Perhaps of even greater significance, of the 3,000 cases studied,
there was not a single motion for sanctions under rule 37(c) for
failure to admit or forcing unnecessary proof.2 Attorneys are ei-
15 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2253, at 706.
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
17 See Finman, supra note 7, at 402-04.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g).
,9 J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL Discov-
ERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 51 (1982).
20 Id. (footnotes omitted).
21 Id. at 50-51.
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ther unaware of this powerful device, or unwilling to use it.
The only factor necessary for successful implementation of ad-
missions practice is an awakening of the bar. Rule 36 can now pro-
vide a potent weapon in the adversary process. Its scope is estab-
lished by the clear and precise wording of its first sentence:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of
any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the re-
quest that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the appli-
cation of law to fact including the genuineness of any documents
described in the request.22
The rule has teeth.23 When a party requesting admission
moves to determine the sufficiency of answers or objections, the
court under rule 37(a)(4) may award to the prevailing party ex-
penses entailed by the motion.24 However, the key to enforcement
is rule 37(c), which empowers the court to award reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, to a party who has been put to
his proof by an unreasonable failure to admit.25
THE END OF THE SPORTING THEORY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE
GREAT GAME
A major impetus to the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 was Roscoe Pound's oft-quoted plea that the
"sporting theory of justice" be laid to rest.26 Dean Pound decried
the system of litigation that permitted counsel to hold for trial dis-
positive evidence and key testimony. Surprise, he felt, had no place
in a genuine contest on the merits.
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
11 "One of the most powerful tools of discovery available to trial lawyers is [the] re-
quest[] for admission provided for in Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Dombroff, supra note 11, at 82.
To serve their purpose, requests to admit should be used early, often, and
precisely. Skillful application of requests to all phases of case preparation and
trial focuses evidence on issues to be decided and on evidence to decide those
issues correctly. Proper application and enforcement of the rules on requests re-
duce judicial and courtroom delay and help resolve a case, and use pretrial and
trial time economically.
Atkinson & White, Requests to Admit, TRIAL, Apr. 1987, at 45, 54.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
25 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
26 Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906).
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The revolutionary thrust of the new Rules was two-pronged.
First, provision was made for "notice pleading." Only "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief" was now required.2 7 Litigants have derived substantial ben-
efits from this less stringent pleading requirement, which has re-
duced technical battles while increasing access to the courts.
The second thrust of the rules revolution was the provision for
ample discovery. As the United States Supreme Court has ob-
served: "Such simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of
both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed
facts and issues. '28
However, while disclosure has been emphasized, relevance has
been virtually ignored. Under the current version of the Federal
Rules, it is enough if the material desired to be obtained through
discovery relates "to the subject matter involved in the pending
action" or is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. ' 29 As a result, discovery has become an end in
itself, often winding aimlessly at incredible expense, with no other
justification than "that is the way things are done." Over a century
ago, Anthony Trollope, in Orley Farm, might as well have been
talking about current discovery practices when he said:
Those practices in which we most widely depart from the broad
and recognized morality of all civilized ages and countries are to
us the Palladiums of our jurisprudence. Modes of proceeding
which, if now first proposed to us would be thought to come di-
rect from the devil, have been made so sacred by time that they
have lost the horror of their falseness in holiness of their age.30
Trollope's lament was echoed more recently by Justice Powell,
joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, who became so dis-
enchanted with the state of modern discovery procedures that they
dissented in the spring of 1980 from the Supreme Court's usually
routine adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure relating to discovery.31 Justice Powell's opinion called for
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
28 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
29 FED. R Cxv. P. 26(b)(1).
'o A. TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARm 159 (Knopf ed. 1950).
21 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 521-23 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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something more basic than mere tinkering with the Rules. But this
impressive call to action may well have underestimated the inertia
which now grips the litigating bar. At least one federal district
judge believes that lawyers simply do not want to get about the
business of trial:
In my 13 years on the bench ... only twice have lawyers asked
me for a trial date. It's the last thing they want. It's expensive, it
takes them away from their other work, they may lose the case,
and most importantly, once the case is over the meter stops
running.3
Attorneys alone are not to blame. Former American Bar Asso-
ciation president Leonard Janofsky has observed that "the comity
that exists between lawyers and judges in a jurisdiction can be the
single most powerful cause of cost to the client and delay in the
work of the courts."3 3
Circuit Judge Parker was undoubtedly more hopeful than ac-
curate when he said that "[a] suit at law is not a children's
game. ' 34 Certainly, modern discovery has become a game of hide-
and-seek. Countless waves of interrogatories, which tend to ob-
scure and not clarify the issues, are routine. Documents are pro-
duced by the carload in the hope that clearly inculpatory papers
will be lost in the shuffle. Genuine issues are masked by ambiguous
pleadings. Depositions, most of which are never referred to at trial,
are often taken for years, failing more often than not to yield a
shred of admissible evidence. And the salutary possibility of early
dispositive motions is virtually eliminated by the mere bulk of pro-
duction in which a triable issue may be lurking.35
Discovery has become the new "Great Game,"36 as lawyers and
"' Pike, Cures Fail: Civil Cases Drag On, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 20, col. 1.
" Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A_ J. 1323,
1324 (1979); see also Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 480, 494-96 (1958) (noting reluctance of judges to "wield[] their powers under rule
37").
" United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947).
" Discovery abuses are well-documented. See, e.g., Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory
Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1069 (1976) (noting attorneys' ex-
cessive use of motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Pollack, Discovery-Its
Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1979) (much abuse has stemmed from attorneys' "vir-
tually unbridled discretion over discovery").
36 Rudyard Kipling and historian H.W.C. Davis popularized the phrase "Great Game"
to describe the nineteenth century British-Russian contest, conducted largely through surro-
gates, for control of the central Asian plateau. The closest current parallel, in terms of in-
trigue as an art form, may be found in the pretrial phase of American litigation.
[Vol. 62:475
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judges have been loath to press for full enforcement of the Rules.
In regard to rules 36 and 37 specifically, courts have too often ac-
cepted without question a party's excuse under rule 36 that it "has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or read-
ily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable [it] to admit or
deny. ' '37 Similarly, courts have been reluctant to assess costs and
attorney's fees under rule 37 for failure to admit, as long as counsel
for the responding party has made the naked assertion that his
client "had reasonable ground to believe that [it] might prevail on
the matter, or [that] there was other good reason for the failure to
admit." '38 It has been easier to delay the decision on these matters
until "final disposition of the request ... at a pre-trial confer-
ence," 39 than it has been to come to grips with the matter at the
outset of the case. In short, the sporting theory is by no means
dead; attorneys have simply changed the way they play the game.
THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE NEW CONFERENCES
The new discovery conference and the advanced pretrial con-
ference may prove to be of great value in probing the substantial-
ity of respondent's excuses for failure to admit. Where counsel, es-
pecially in a complex case, alleges that "reasonable inquiry" has
failed to produce the "readily obtainable" information needed to
answer the request, the judge at the conference must press counsel
to estimate the time required to review his client's files and to re-
spond. Unless it is clear that there is a dispositive motion which
should precede this undertaking, an attorney should be ordered,
within a reasonable period, to learn his own case, and to admit or
deny his adversary's request.
Under the Federal Rules, an application for a discovery con-
ference must begin with a statement of issues as they then ap-
pear. ° It is here that requests for admission can first be used to
eliminate and refine issues which are too often cloaked by ambigu-
ous pleadings. The omnibus interrogatory, served simultaneously
with the requests, will act to pinpoint specific bases for denial and
names of witnesses who have personal knowledge of such bases.
An attorney who causes prolonged and unnecessary discovery
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
38 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
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by posing evasive or superficial responses to requests for admission
must be held to account. Either he or his client should pay the
costs and considerable attorney's fees engendered by such actions.
Two common examples of lawyer conduct that can cause expensive
litigation come to mind: the unscrupulous plaintiff's attorney in
class or derivative actions who simply keeps discovery rolling for
years in order to justify his fee on eventual settlement; and the
well-heeled defendant's lawyer who uses discovery in complex
cases as a weapon of attrition to wear down a less affluent plaintiff.
Attorneys, in the past, have been permitted to proceed along these
paths virtually without risk. Now, however, resourceful adversaries,
supported by conscientious judges, can use admissions practice to
put an end to these excesses by making the assessment of attor-
ney's fees a likely consequence of such questionable pursuits.
There may well be a new readiness on the part of the courts to
accept admissions practice as a solution to the present litigation
impasse. Certainly there is a noticeable predisposition to eliminate
discovery abuses. In addition to Justice Powell's dissent, there
have been other indications from the Supreme Court that more
stringent control by the courts over the discovery process is re-
quired.41 The creation, in 1980, of the rule 26(f) discovery confer-
ence was directly responsive to this judicial concern, as was the
expansion, in 1983, of the rule 16 pretrial conference. Importantly,
rule 16 continues to include as a subject for discussion "the possi-
bility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof. ' 42 While the traditional premise for
avoidance of response is still in rule 36, postponement of "final dis-
position" of the request until the pretrial conference no longer pro-
vides automatic delay until the eve of trial. Under the revised rule
16, the initial occasion for this judicial decision is advanced to the
first 120 days of the lawsuit.43
While there is fear that judges may use the new procedures to
abandon the traditional adversary process in order to dispose of
41 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Justice White underlined the need
for judges to exercise "appropriate control" to ensure speedy and inexpensive discovery. Id.
at 177; see also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (Court upheld district judge's dismissal under rule 37 of action in which plaintiffs
failed to answer written interrogatories in timely manner).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(3).
Rule 16(b) now reads in pertinent part: "The [scheduling] order shall issue as soon as
practicable but in no event more than 120 days after filing of the complaint." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(b).
[Vol. 62:475
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cases quickly,"4 the more prevalent concern regarding judicial in-
volvement in discovery is that the court's time is simply too valua-
ble to spend on these matters. 5 However, the more progressive
view may be seen in the work of such creative judges as Chief
Judge Peckham of the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California, who has been a leader in maintaining
that such procedures provide for efficient judicial case manage-
ment. 6 In a similar vein, Judge Medina has noted that "[o]ne of
the prime objectives of [the pretrial conference] is to do away with
the old sporting theory of justice and substitute a more enlight-
ened policy of putting the cards on the table, so to speak, and
keeping surprise tactics down to a minimum."4 Admissions prac-
tice provides a procedure whereby the attorneys can give the judge
sufficient information to effectively deal with issues early in the
course of the litigation, while preserving the traditional adversary
mode. Lawyers and judges must now learn how far a court can go
at pretrial conferences under the present rules in pressing an attor-
ney to sufficiently learn his own case in order to respond to a re-
quest to admit.
THE NEED FOR PERIODIC REvIEw
Chief Judge Peckham and others48 have successfully used peri-
odic discovery conferences under appropriate local rules to define
issues and control discovery. Although it was originally contem-
plated that rule 26(f) conferences would be the exception rather
than the rule,4" the Manual for Complex Litigation has observed
that judges should act sua sponte in calling such conferences in
potentially complex cases where discovery seems to be getting out
" See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 445 (1982) (justice, not
efficient case management, must be judiciary's paramount concern).
"5 See, e.g., Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The Continuing
Need for an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 543, 557 (1980) (amendments to Federal Rules
have attempted to reduce need for judicial intervention in discovery).
4' See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 passim (1981).
47 Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006
(1964).
48 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATION ON MAJOR ISSUES AF-
FECTING COMPLEX LITIGATION 14-15 (1981) (describing the approach to discovery adopted by
Judge Greene in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C.
1978)).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION, SECOND § 20.13 (1985).
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of control.50 Counsel have always been expected at such confer-
ences to prepare statements of the issues as they perceive them.
After a discovery conference, the court enters "an order tentatively
identifying the issues for discovery purposes." 51 Rule 16 also lists
as a subject for the pretrial conference "the formulation and sim-
plification of the issues." '52 Requests for admission should be used
to aid this process. It is the combination of the exchange of re-
quests addressed to issue reduction and formulation within the
conference setting that yields the promise of the new approach. An
exchange of requests for admission prior to the discovery confer-
ence will enable the court to know the positions of the opposing
parties. If more time is needed to conduct a bona fide "reasonable
inquiry," periodic discovery conferences and successive requests
for admission may be used.
There is concern in some quarters that the new rules of dis-
covery will create a satellite motion practice, or a new layer of in-
quiry, which itself could become burdensome.53 This concern is
misplaced if admissions practice is properly policed by the courts.
Comprehensive requests for admission-designed to elicit genuine
issues and only necessary facts-might well replace "waves" of in-
terrogatories and parades of unnecessary deponents. The single
omnibus interrogatory, served simultaneously with requests for ad-
mission, can probe specific bases for denial and obtain information
on the identity of witnesses who can supply further information,
and all of this with far greater economy and efficiency than other
devices now employed more or less automatically by litigators.
However, judges must constantly be aware of the unfortunate ten-
dency of lawyers to develop new "games." Great care must be
taken lest admissions practice itself gives way to the lawyer's
penchant for prolixity. Some years ago, an attorney requested ex-
penses for failure to admit in a case in which he could have just as
easily obtained the information himself. Chief Judge Hall of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California
denied the request, noting that "[i]f a lawsuit is merely to be a
game . . .some other court than this one is going to have to say
o See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, supra note 49, §§ 20.1, 20.13.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
53 See Lerner & Schwartz, Why Rule 11 Shouldn't Be Changed, Nat'l L.J., May 9,
1983, at 13, col. 1.
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so."'54 If all judges handle admissions practice with such a notion in
mind, requests for admission can be effectively used in conjunction
with the pretrial conferences to clarify the issues before the court
and lessen the delays typically associated with discovery in the
past.
SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF HEIGHTENED PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
How far must a lawyer go in responding to a request to admit?
While he may not have an ethical duty to "prove" the other side's
case, "a reasonable burden may be imposed on the parties when its
discharge will facilitate preparation for trial and ease the trial pro-
cess." '6 At some point, counsel must conduct an investigation in
order to prepare his own case. It is in revealing the facts unearthed
in this process-or the information which becomes "readily availa-
ble" as investigation proceeds-that the sporting theory dies
hardest.
The draftsmen of the "Kutak Code,16 adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association House of Delegates in August, 1983, have at-
tempted to create a more affirmative duty on the part of counsel in
the discovery process. In some instances, there would appear to be
only a moderate increase in a lawyer's professional responsibility.
Rule 3.2, for example, requires a lawyer to "make reasonable ef-
forts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the cli-
ent, '57 and rule 3.4(d) entreats a lawyer not to "make a frivolous
discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to com-
ply with a legally proper discovery request. '58 But rule 3.4(a) ap-
pears to go well beyond the requirements of the old ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 3.4(a) provides that a lawyer
shall not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value or counsel or assist another per-
son to do any such act."' 9
" Goldberg v. International Testing Corp., 30 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) advisory committee's note.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (amended 1987).
11 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1983).
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) (1983).
' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983); cf. MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1983) (prohibiting lawyer from concealing or
knowingly failing "to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal"). See generally
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It is unlikely that the process of ethical reform will lead to
immediate relief in the discovery process. Instructive on this point
are the objections which were addressed to an earlier draft of the
Model Rules by the New York State Bar Association's Special
Committee to Review the ABA Draft Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Committee found that the draft was "deficient and
unacceptable," citing as major drawbacks:
Possible loss of the nationwide agreement which presently exists
on matters of professional ethics... ; [h]ighly probable loss of the
ability to use thousands of cases and ethics opinions applying the
[existing Code's] principles to problems encountered in real-life
situations ... ; and [t]he need to reeducate the Bar, disciplinary
agencies and the courts to the new and untried language of the
Model Rules.6
While implementation of specific rules of conduct in specific
states may be delayed, the debate over the Kutak Code provides
encouraging evidence that the climate for admissions practice is
more favorable than ever.
Moreover, certain of the recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,6 like their ethical counterparts, are in-
tended to raise the standards of attorney conduct in the discovery
process. Rules 7, 11, and 26(g), in particular, seek to subject law-
yers to a "good faith" standard in all litigation papers, and a duty
to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" before responding to discovery
requests, specifically including, in the Advisory Committee com-
ments to the 1983 amendments, the hitherto ignored requests to
admit.2 On their face, these rule changes would seem to add little
to the obligations already established in almost exactly the same
terms under rules 36(a) and 37(g). But even if the new rules are
viewed as merely duplicative of the standard already included in
the admissions area, the amendments represent a reaffirmation of
the attorney's duty to make reasonable inquiry in good faith. They
also offer encouragement to the courts to enforce sanctions in in-
stances of abuse.6 In this context, counsel responding to a request
Edelstein, supra note 35, at 1078-80 (suggesting need for greater professional obligation in
discovery).
80 Hochberger, State Bar Report Criticizes ABA Draft Code of Ethics, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
10, 1980, at 1, col. 3 (quoting Special Committee Report).
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11 & 26(g).
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11 & 26(g) advisory committee's notes.
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note; see FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11 advisory
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for admissions will be subjected to greater scrutiny than ever
before if he seeks to justify lack of compliance by asserting that
information is not "readily obtainable." This is especially true with
admissions practice, where the excuse is not simply set out in an
affidavit, but is reviewed in the course of a face-to-face confronta-
tion in a discovery conference, or in response to a searching omni-
bus interrogatory.
Under heightened rules of professional responsibility, an attor-
ney must keep his response current. Accordingly, admissions prac-
tice requires periodic conferences and continuing informed in-
tercession by the court. If an attorney does not in fact have
sufficient information to respond at an earlier point in the proceed-
ings, he must, on finding that his response was incorrect, inform
the court and his adversary at a subsequent conference. 4 "Good
faith" requires no less.
STRATEGY UNDER THE NEW RULES
In the late nineteenth century, a commentator writing in the
Harvard Law Review observed that "[c]ommon law pleading was
the mill of justice in which an undefined, obscure mass of fact was
ground down to clear and distinct issues."6 Regrettably, this pro-
cess became corrupted in time, as lawyers used assumpsit, trespass,
trover, ejectment, and the other old forms to delay and obscure. It
was in large part to eliminate this technical obfuscation that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were passed in 1938. However, as
we have seen, lawyers have never fully utilized requests for admis-
sion to fill the gap in issue clarification which attended the birth of
notice pleading.
The present climate is ideal for a return to the clear and dis-
tinct issue formulation enjoyed at common law, without the bur-
den of hypertechnical pleading. But a good deal of "conventional
wisdom" must be swept away in the process. It would be tragic if
the opportunity provided by the early pretrial conference is ig-
nored or abused. Ironically, those who see the judge only as a
scheduler frequently suggest a totally mechanistic approach: allow
committee's notes.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
" Note, Common Law Pleading, 10 HARv. L. REv. 238 (1896); see also Weinstein &
Distler, Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 518, 520-23 (1957) (tracing history of
pleading).
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one set of interrogatories, a certain number of depositions, and just
so many days for document production, regardless of the nature of
the case. This thinking guarantees a continuation of the same kind
of mindless discovery that has led to cries for reform. It also in-
sures satellite litigation as attorneys apply for the inevitable con-
tinunces and expanded discovery. Most importantly, the mechan-
istic school ignores completely the other changes in the Rules, set
forth in detail above, which provide the basis for an informed ap-
proach to case management.
If discovery is directed more toward issue formulation and re-
duction, and less toward unbridled accumulation of information,
the entire process can be made more productive."' The assumption
that "all facts must be in" before the court can deal with issues is
not well-grounded. Certain issues can be dealt with early in the
case, while others may need more time-but time justified in terms
of specific requests and an explanation of the difficulty in response.
The process is progressive. The Advisory Committee must have be-
lieved this or it never would have recommended that the time of
the pretrial conference be moved up to the beginning of the litiga-
tion continuum, while retaining the goal of formulating issues, ob-
taining admissions, and eliminating frivolous claims and defenses.
Requests for admission lie somewhere between the pleading and
fact-gathering functions. Thus, their sweep should be more funda-
mental, that is, more directed toward issues, than other discovery
devices. If so used, their ultimate effect may be greatly to reduce,
or even to replace, those other devices.
A court can pursue this productive role at the outset of a case
through the method of logical analysis. Lawsuits are, inescapably,
syllogistic in form. "The major premise is the rule of law involved
which is never explicitly stated .... The minor premise consists of
the facts which the pleader claims bring his case within the opera-
tion of the rule of law embodied in the major premise."67 By ana-
6 It has been suggested that:
Nothing can be more effective in expediting discovery and bringing litigation
into focus than filing requests for admissions at the very outset of litigation. By
doing so, you may find that.., a good bit of what you felt would be in dispute in
the case is not in dispute at all.
Dombroff, supra note 11, at 85; see also Schwarzer, Guidelines for Discovery, Motion Prac-
tice and Trial, 117 F.R.D. 273, 277 (1987) ("Requests for admission are an economical and
efficient means of making a record of informal exchanges of information.., and of narrow-
ing issues.").
M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 109 (2nd ed. 1979).
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lyzing their adversaries' pleadings-their implicit major premise, if
you will-attorneys can draft their requests to ascertain whether a
factual basis exists-the minor premise-for the claim or denial.
Some brave pioneers have already used this method to their ad-
vantage: "If counsel is uncertain as to whether a matter will be
controverted," they point out, "a request [for admission] may be
stated in terms of application of law to fact. In other words, flag
the issues to determine opposition counsel's position." 8
THE BENEFITS OF THE NEW APPROACH
In the past, the judge's job at the pretrial and discovery con-
ferences has been difficult, if not impossible, mainly due to the
combined effect of the lack of issue clarification engendered by no-
tice pleading and the amorphous relevancy limitations placed by
the Rules on discovery proceedings. The solution does not require
statesmanship, or self-sacrifice, or an idealistic quest for reform. It
simply requires one adversary who will pursue admissions practice,
and a judge who will enforce the recent amendments to the civil
rules relating to discovery. By serving requests for admission
before the first pretrial conference, an attorney can eliminate areas
of inquiry as he obtains admissions. Most likely, the process will
force his adversary to do likewise.
Admissions practice can be implemented by a single party who
finds the procedure to work in his particular interest. If his adver-
sary insists on playing the conventional game, and forces the un-
necessary pursuit of information by positing a false issue-or an
issue in which it is highly unlikely that factual support can be
mustered-the court can later order the offending party to pay the
costs, including attorney's fees, involved in the fruitless search.
Under admissions practice, wars of attrition will henceforth involve
a considerable financial risk. Admissions practice thus moves in
the direction of changing the "American rule," whereby attorney's
fees have been borne by the respective parties regardless of the
result of the litigation. The American rule emerged in colonial days
as a meaningful part of our indigenous independent spirit. Every
American would have his day in court. But admissions practice in-
troduces a salutary middle ground. Fees, unlike under the British
system, are not simply taxed to the losing party. Here they are
'a K CALLAHAN, B. BRAMBLE & F. RAPOPORT, DISCOVERY IN CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION
§ 9-3(A) (2d ed. 1987).
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assessed to the party causing unnecessary proof.69 In short, admis-
sions practice presents a useful, perhaps ideal, method of deter-
rence of discovery abuse, while carefully retaining the traditional
right to a day in court.
Throughout all of this, counsel may have a justification for
failures to admit. Rule 37(c) excuses sanctions where a party had
reasonable grounds to believe that he would prevail. Under a truly
effective system of discovery, these are exactly the issues which
should be preserved for trial.
Admissions practice also establishes a favorable vehicle for
early settlement of the case or for alternate dispute resolution pro-
cedures, such as mini-trials. The parties quickly gain a more realis-
tic understanding of their positions, fewer issues remain for trial,
anA a venerable weapon for forcing unmerited settlements-the
expense which protracted discovery adds to the prosecution or de-
fense of a claim-is reduced or eliminated. Furthermore, as one
commentator has observed, "forcing formal admissions of facts"
can be especially valuable in "laying the foundation for a motion
for summary judgment. 7 0 Similarly, concerns as to the suitability
of juries as triers of fact in a complex modern society are allayed
by admissions practice-with fewer issues and a narrower ambit of
proof, complex questions are more susceptible to jury de-
termination.
CONCLUSION
Admissions practice can mean that cases will proceed on their
merits, without distraction caused by delay, concealment, or the
accumulation of unnecessary attorney's fees. Discovery must be
seen as the obstacle it has become, and stripped of the sacredness
with which bench and bar have cloaked it. Although attorneys may
never tire of treating litigation as a game, it is time, as Judge Me-
dina observed, to use the pretrial and the discovery conferences for
"putting the cards on the table." In such a vein, admissions prac-
tice can be utilized to lead to the less protracted and more efficient
resolution of disputes, as the original draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure intended long ago.
69 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
70 M. GREEN, supra note 67, at 158.
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